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ABSTRACT 
 
 Psychological theories often reduce descriptions of people’s emotional 
experiences to a small number of underlying dimensions that capture most of the 
variation in their responses. These underlying dimensions are typically uncovered by 
comparing the self-reported emotions of many individuals at one specific time point, to 
infer a single underlying structure of emotion for all people. However, theoretical work 
suggests that underlying dimensions uncovered in this way may not hold when modeling 
how people change over time. Individuals may differ not just in their typical score on a 
given dimension of emotion, but in what dimensions best characterize their patterns of 
emotional experience over time. In this study, participants described two emotional 
events per day for 35 days, and analyses compared individualized structures of emotion 
to those generated from many people at one point in time. Analyses using R-technique 
factor analysis, which compares many people at one time point, most often uncovered a 
two-factor solution corresponding to positivity and negativity dimensions - a solution 
well-established in the literature. However, analyses using P-technique factor analysis, 
which compares many emotional events for one person, uncovered a broader diversity of 
underlying dimensions. Individuals needed anywhere from one to five factors to best 
capture their self-reported emotions. Further, dimensions specifically related to romantic 
relationships were much more common when examining the experiences of individuals 
over time. This suggests that external factors, such as pursuing or being in a romantic 
relationship, might lead to a qualitative shift in how emotions are experienced. Research 
attempting to characterize emotion dynamics, including those attempting to help people 
shift or regulate their emotions, cannot assume that typical two dimensional structures of 
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emotional experience apply to all people. Instead we must account for how individuals 
describe their own emotional experiences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Emotions have important psychological and behavioral consequences, influencing 
the way we socialize, what we remember, how we evaluate information, and what goals 
we pursue (Fischer & Manstead, 2016; Izard, 2007; Lazarus, 1991; Levenson, 2003; 
Shiota et al., 2014). Psychologists have long used people’s reports on their own 
emotional experiences to try to gain insight into deeper structures underlying emotion. 
For example, the conceptual act theory describes two biologically basic dimensions of 
emotion (Barrett, 2006a). These were originally derived from an analysis of people’s self-
reported emotions (Russell, 1980). Even among theorists who do not claim to identify 
biologically basic or universal dimensions of emotion, many acknowledge the importance 
of people’s appraisals—or subjective interpretations of situations—for behavioral and 
physiological outcomes (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984).  
Most studies examining individuals’ ratings of their emotional experiences are 
based on comparisons of many people at one specific time point. However, theoretical 
and empirical work has found that psychological constructs established by examining a 
cross section of people at one point in time do not necessarily apply to people changing 
over time (Molenaar, 2004; Molenaar & Campbell, 2009). This means that, although a set 
of core dimensions emerges repeatedly when analyzing data from a survey taken at one 
time point, these core dimensions might not apply to any of the specific people surveyed 
across time points. To establish how people’s emotions change, each individual’s specific 
pattern of responses needs to be analyzed separately. The underlying dimensions that 
correspond to how people change can only be established at the individual level. 
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In this study, I examined different individuals’ underlying emotional dynamics. I 
characterized each individual’s emotional life by examining which states she or he tended 
to experience together. The way that emotions tend to be experienced together in one 
individual, as compared to others, makes up the idiographic structure of emotion for that 
person. For example, one individual might tend to experience pride, anger, and 
excitement together in one common group (a “controlling” set of emotions), while 
sadness, fear, and embarrassment are felt in another common group (a “powerless” set of 
emotions). Another individual, meanwhile, might feel pride, enthusiasm, and amusement 
together (a “positive” set of emotions), while anger, fear, and embarrassment make up 
another group (a “negative” set of emotions). The emotional structures of these 
individuals’ experiences fall along different dimensions, and these suggest different 
underlying ways of responding to the world.  
 I compared the results of these person-specific analyses to more typical analyses 
that assume all individuals have the same underlying emotional structure. By comparing 
these two types of analyses, we can determine what nuances are missed when we assume 
that all individuals think about and describe their emotional experiences in the same way.   
 
THE STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
Is there a common underlying structure that captures the way we subjectively 
experience emotion? Emotion researchers have debated this question for generations 
(Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; Cacioppo et al., 2000; Ekman, 1992; Izard, 
1977; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Typical studies ask participants to rate on a Likert scale 
how strongly they feel (or felt) a series of emotions—using terms like angry, afraid, or 
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excited—during an emotional episode (Russell, 1980; Scherer, 2005; Watson & Tellegen, 
1985). These ratings are analyzed using a statistical dimension reduction technique, such 
as multi-dimensional scaling (e.g., Russell, 1980) or exploratory factor analysis (e.g., 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  
Results from these studies typically find two, three, or four underlying dimensions 
are needed to capture the patterns of variability in self-reports, depending on the terms 
and sample used (Bradley & Lang, 1994; Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth, 2007; 
Scherer, 2005; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The most commonly reported structure 
involves two factors. One two-factor structure includes valence (positive to negative 
experiences) and arousal (activated/energized to calm/low energy; Russell, 1980). 
Another includes positivity and negativity as separate dimensions (so that an individual 
can be high in both positivity and negativity at once, for example; Watson & Tellegen, 
1985). Two versions of the arousal dimension have also been proposed for describing 
emotional experience: tension (from tense to calm) and energetic arousal (from energetic 
to tired; Thayer, 1989). However, subsequent researchers have suggested that all these 
two-dimensional solutions are variants on the same underlying psychological structure, 
with each research group having labeled the underlying dimensions differently depending 
on the rotation method used in their analysis (Yik, Russell, & Feldman-Barrett, 1999). 
Beyond these two factor structures, other researchers have reported a three-factor 
structure: valence, potency/control (in control to apathetic), and arousal (Osgood, May, & 
Miron, 1975). Another study that included terms related not just to subjective feelings but 
also to other aspects of emotion (like physiological responses) found four factors: 
valence, potency, arousal, and unpredictability (Fontaine et al., 2007). Recent work with 
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an extensive rating list (76 terms) found five factors relating to what are typically thought 
of as emotion categories: joy, anger, sadness, fear, and shame/jealousy (Osborne, 2014). 
In addition to these approaches, higher order structures have been proposed based on 
appraisal theories. In appraisal theory, emotions arise from a set of underlying evaluative 
dimensions—such as motivational state, situational state, probability, legitimacy, and 
agency (Roseman, 1984)—but these are not derived solely from self-reports of emotion. 
Studies on the structure of emotional experience fall into the broad category of 
psychological measurement research: trying to understand the unobserved psychological 
constructs causing thought and behavior. From examining the underlying patterns of self-
report responses, larger psychological theories of emotion have been constructed. Most 
notably, psychological constructivist theories suggest that valence and arousal are core 
components of experience and more specific emotion labels are added based on 
situational features (Barrett, 2006b; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008). This has guided further 
work in other areas, such as research on facial expressions and neural correlates of 
emotion (Gendron, Roberson, van der Vyver, Feldman Barrett, 2014; Kober et al., 2008).  
Although lay descriptions may not fully address the biological complexity 
underlying emotion, the way that people report their own experiences is certainly an 
important part of emotion (Barrett, 2006b; Scherer, 2009). Because asking people how 
they feel is an obvious first step to studying emotion, self-reports are often employed as a 
comparison point for identifying the neurological and peripheral physiological bases of 
emotion. Understanding how people describe their own emotional experiences thus plays 
a central role in a broader theoretical understanding of emotional processes, including 
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how we interpret the emotions of others. New conceptions of the underlying dimensions 
of emotion therefore have the potential to influence large bodies of related research. 
 
PERSONALIZED EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES:  
IDIOGRAPHIC VERSUS NOMOTHETIC APPROACHES 
 
Traditional approaches to psychological measurement make a central—but often 
overlooked—assumption about the structure of psychological constructs: all individuals 
have the same basic dimensions (Cervone, 2004; 2005; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; 
Molenaar, 2004; Molenaar & Campbell, 2009). In other words, when researchers try to 
uncover the structure of emotion, they assume there is a single structure in emotion 
responding for all people. Whether the structure includes valence and arousal or valence, 
control, and arousal, the only difference between individuals is where they fall on these 
dimensions at any given moment.  
The alternative to this variable-centered approach—traditionally referred to as the 
nomothetic approach—is a person-centered approach—the idiographic approach. In 
person-centered approaches, the essential structural similarity of all individuals is not 
assumed. Instead, different individuals can have different underlying psychological 
structures. More concretely, it might be the case that while I tend to describe my 
emotional experiences based on valence and arousal, my friend might describe her 
emotional experiences based on valence, control, and arousal. This means that when I 
report my responses to emotional events, I make a different set of distinctions than her. I 
might think of feeling sad and feeling angry as both negative, and so report feeling these 
emotions together. My friend might feel sadness when she has low control but anger 
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when she has high control, and so report feeling these emotions at different points, based 
on whether she feels more or less in control of her life. 
To take a person-centered approach, researchers need to shift their frame of 
reference. Instead of comparing one individual, measured at one time, to all other 
individuals measured at that same time, the person-centered researcher should compare 
one individual, measured at one time, to him- or herself at other points in time (Molenaar, 
2004). Conceptually, this shift is an expansion of the way researchers consider individual 
differences. In the variable-focused approach, individuals are characterized by their level 
on a specific construct—for example an extraversion score, or a positivity score. The 
person-centered approach suggests that there are differences at the level of process—
what is being measured differs from person to person (Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Read & 
Miller, 2002; Read et al., 2010; Molenaar, 2004). For example, an individual might not 
have extraversion or positivity as relevant dimensions; instead, the individual might have 
a dimension corresponding to a mix of extraversion and agreeableness or a dimension 
that corresponds to positive social emotions. This heterogeneity in underlying dimensions 
can arise through individual differences in the typical responses and appraisals of 
situations that an individual makes. People can parse the world in different ways.  
Personality researchers have been at the forefront of this approach (Cervone, 
2004; 2005; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; 1999). One important example from personality 
psychology helps to illustrate the idiographic approach clearly. The dominant taxonomy 
in personality is the “Big Five” model (John & Srivastava, 1999; McCrae & Costa, 
1999). Five Factor Theory was developed, like theories of the structure of emotional 
experience, through exploratory dimension reduction techniques on a series of Likert 
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ratings. Researchers asked participants to rate themselves on long lists of personality 
characteristics, and found five underlying constructs best account for the variability in 
responses: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. 
Researchers assumed that these personality dimensions—which were developed using a 
variable-centered approach—would also generalize to describe the structure of 
individuals rating themselves day in and day out (Lamiell, 1998; McCrae & John, 1992). 
In an oft re-analyzed experiment, Borkenau and Ostendorf (1998) asked 
participants to make daily ratings on a “Big Five” personality scale for 90 days. When 
this data set is analyzed using a traditional, variable-centered factor analysis, it yields the 
“Big Five” factors (Molenaar & Campbell, 2009). That is, if you wanted to characterize 
the differences between the individuals in the study on any given day, the “Big Five” 
factors would be the best way to do it. But a factor analysis can also be conducted on all 
the measurements made for a single individual throughout the study. This type of factor 
analysis—dubbed P-technique factor analysis—finds the underlying structure in one 
individual’s pattern of responses across many different time points (Cattell, Cattell, & 
Rhymer, 1947; Molenaar & Nesselroade, 2012). Conducting separate P-technique 
analyses on each of the participants revealed that none of them had the traditional five-
factor structure in self-ratings at the individual level. Instead, many of the participants 
had dramatically different underlying factor structures—with two to six different factors, 
depending on the individual. 
These different personality structures corroborate a statistical point regarding 
these two approaches: just because researchers see a particular set of structures when 
conducting a variable-centered analysis, we cannot assume the same set of structures will 
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be present in a person-centered analysis (Molenaar, 2004; Molenaar & Campbell, 2009). 
The two approaches are capturing different information. Traditional factor analysis 
(referred to as R-technique by Cattell, 1952) captures how individuals differ from each at 
a given point in time. The P-technique, being person-centered, is capturing how an 
individual’s view of her- or himself changes from day to day. For example, one 
individual might think of themselves as more or less sociable and productive on different 
days, whereas another individual might think of themselves as more intellectually curious 
and agreeable on different days. What is needed to understand the processes generating 
each person’s perception of him- or herself over time is a comparison of that individual 
against themselves. 
There is reason to suspect that there are important individual differences in the 
underlying dynamics of emotional responding. For example, researchers have found that 
individuals differ in how closely their self-reported emotion matches their physiological 
responding—referred to as the coherence of their emotional responding—and that more 
coherent responses are related to feeling greater well-being (Van Doren, Brown, Sze, & 
Levenson, 2015). This is an individual difference in what aspects of emotion travel 
together. Inertia, or how slowly an individual moves through emotion space, has also 
been linked to depression proneness—those who are slower to move through emotion 
space are more prone to depression (Houben, Van Den Noortgate, Kuppens, 2015). This 
is an individual difference in how emotions change over time. 
One of the best developed areas of idiographic research on emotion is research on 
emotional granularity—also referred to as emotion differentiation (Barrett, 1995; 
Lindquist & Barrett, 2008; Smidt & Suvak, 2015). Emotional granularity refers to the 
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degree to which people can make distinctions between their emotions, based on their 
conceptual knowledge about emotions. Empirically, emotional granularity is measured by 
examining a series of ratings of emotion terms in a set of individuals over time—an 
idiographic approach—and calculating the pairwise correlations or intraclass correlation 
coefficients (ICC) between a predetermined group of emotion ratings. Larger correlations 
or ICC are indicative of lower granularity, because the emotion terms being analyzed are 
used more often in the same situation. Emotional granularity measures are often taken 
just for a set of positive or negative emotion terms, leading to positive emotion 
granularity and negative emotion granularity scores (Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & 
Benvenuto, 2001; Tugade, Fredrickson, & Barrett, 2004). Researchers have shown that 
these idiographic emotion indices are related to outcomes such as emotion regulation and 
coping styles, and that less ability to differentiate among emotions is related to clinical 
disorders such as autism, borderline personality disorder, and depression (Barrett, Gross, 
Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001; Tugade, Fredrickson, & Barrett, 2004, Smidt & Suvik, 
2015). 
The emotional granularity approach is an important precursor to this research, 
because it compares emotion ratings for a single person at many time points. However, it 
takes an impoverished approach analytically, compared to a P-technique analysis. 
Emotional granularity measures only examine two emotions at a time, and then average 
all the pairwise comparisons, whereas P-technique analysis accounts for the full set of 
inter-correlations among emotion ratings. Emotional granularity measures cannot find 
common underlying patterns in a set of correlations, while P-technique analysis explicitly 
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attempts to find common dimensions that can account for the pattern of relationships 
between ratings.  
In a footnote on a paper about emotional granularity, Barrett addresses the 
possibility of using P-technique factor analysis for emotion ratings over time (Barrett, 
2004). She dismisses this approach by saying that factor analysis involves ambiguities, 
such as factor identification. However, all theoretical work involves ambiguity, as the 
task is to determine coherent explanations for the messiness of the observed world. By 
avoiding ambiguity at the level of analysis, emotional granularity measures assume the 
answer to a significant theoretical question: whether a two dimension structure really 
does apply to emotion all individuals’ ratings of their feelings. 
The emotional granularity literature therefore moves in an idiographic direction, 
but does not fully embrace the implications of this research tradition. As methodological 
researchers have shown, underlying distinctions made when analyzing data 
nomothetically typically will not apply when analyzing data idiographically (Molenaar, 
2004; Molenaar & Campbell, 2009). The two factor valence and arousal structure that the 
constructivist theory proposes was developed using nomothetic analyses, and so it may 
not necessarily apply to any individual person’s conception of emotions. The analyses I 
am conducting here therefore take an important step missing from emotional granularity 
research. If an idiographic analysis suggests that positivity and negativity are not the core 
underlying dimensions along which a specific individual rates their emotional 
experiences, then calculating positive and negative emotional granularity for these 
individuals would not be appropriate. In fact, P-technique factor analysis might actually 
suggest different ways of conceptualizing granularity. Emotional complexity might be 
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thought of as the number of underlying dimensions needed to account for the majority of 
variation in a pattern of responses. The number of factors uncovered by a P-technique 
factor analysis are one way of capturing the distinctiveness of emotion conceptualizations 
that respects the need for idiographic analysis. 
Newer approaches in emotion research have also begun to embrace an idiographic 
perspective. For example, relations between self-reported emotions over time have also 
been characterized as a network, with emotions as nodes and their co-occurrence 
corresponding to connections between nodes (Bringmann et al., 2016). The strength of 
these connections can differ among individuals. For example, individuals high in 
neuroticism were found to have networks that involved more dense connections between 
emotion self-reports—particularly connections among negative self-reports. In network 
theory, these interconnections are thought to reflect the degree to which activation of one 
node increases the likelihood of the activation of others. This suggests that negativity is 
particularly “contagious” for some people, being more likely to trigger a change in many 
other emotions (applying epidemiological models to emotion networks is a new and 
developing area; see Fisher, Reeves, Lawyer, & Rubel, under review). One way to think 
about neuroticism, therefore, is as a condition where negative emotions tend to spread 
quickly, reinforcing each other over time.  
Network models, like idiographic models, represent a departure from traditional 
theorizing. Instead of assuming that participant responses are caused by a small group of 
underlying constructs, network models simply characterize the relationships between 
many different responses using connection strength (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; 
Bringmann et al., 2016; Schmittman et al., 2013). More recently, researchers have 
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applied a person-centered analysis strategy to described individual differences in the 
structure of emotion networks among people suffering from anxiety and depression 
(Fisher, Reeves, Lawyer, & Rubel, under review). These idiographic network models 
attempt to determine individual differences in the way emotions influence each other over 
time, with the ultimate goal of developing personalized therapies (Fisher, 2015). 
Attempts to characterize how ratings of emotions are related to each other in idiographic 
analyses are thus an expanding area of the emotion literature. 
Research on the daily dynamics of emotion is also a rapidly growing field, but 
much of the research in this area assumes that the underlying structure of emotional 
experience over time is the same as that found in nomothetic analyses (Kuppens, 
Oravecz, & Tuerlinckx, 2010; Timmermans, Van Mechelen, & Kuppens, 2010; Chow, 
Zu, Shifren, & Zhang, 2011). For example, a set of measures of emotion dynamics—such 
as “pulse” and “spin”—have been developed based on the assumption that emotional 
experiences can best be conceptualized as points in a circle defined by two axes: valence 
and arousal (Timmermans, Van Mechelen, & Kuppens, 2010). This circumplex model of 
emotional experience is one among several theories that have emerged from dimension 
reduction techniques in variable-centered approaches (Russell, 1980; Yik, Russell, & 
Feldman-Barrett, 1999). Theories about the underlying psychological structure of 
emotional experiences guide not just the analysis of a particular data set, but also what 
researchers choose to ask participants about their experiences—as well as the design and 
analysis of experiments in other, related areas (Gendron, Roberson, van der Vyver, 
Feldman Barrett, 2014; Kober et al., 2008). 
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Research on idiographic approaches to personality has demonstrated that it is not 
safe to assume a variable-centered model will apply to person-centered data (Molenaar, 
2004; Cervone, 2005; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Ergodicity, which is the formal 
mathematical condition under which variable-centered models and person-centered 
models will be equivalent, can only be met when examining certain types of processes. 
For example, cyclic processes violate ergodicity, and so any emotional cycles cannot be 
captured using a variable-centered model. Similarly, any process where learning or 
development takes place—for example, people learning to better differentiate or regulate 
their emotions—cannot be captured by a variable-centered model. If we have reason to 
suspect that emotion processes violate ergodicity—because they involve cycles, learning, 
or other temporal changes—then we need to examine the specific structures of 
individuals’ changing emotions. Understanding the way that emotions vary within 
different individuals might contradict the current paradigms on which new work on 
emotion dynamics is being built. For example, pulse and spin in emotion ratings depend 
on using a two-dimensional space that might not adequately characterize most people. 
My theoretical proposal is that, just as variable-centered and person-centered 
approaches to the structure of personality yield different results, so will variable-centered 
and person-centered approaches to the factor structure of affect. More specifically, I 
suggest that each person has a distinct structure in their emotional experiences that will 
not necessarily apply to others. The structure of an individual’s emotional experiences 
describes which emotions they tend to experience together, and how these experiences 
change over time. For example, one person might experience all positive emotions 
together—such as enthusiasm, contentment, and pride—while negative emotions are felt 
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in two distinct groupings—one for negative internal evaluations, such as embarrassment 
and guilt, and another for negative external evaluations, such as anger and disgust. 
Knowing that this individual is feeling pride provides information about his other positive 
states—he is also likely feeling enthusiasm—but not about his negative states. These are 
separable constructs, which suggest qualitatively different emotional responses.  
At a broader level, finding distinct emotional structures for different individuals 
would change the way we think about emotions theoretically. It would suggest that 
characterizing a group of people’s emotional responding to a single event does not tell us 
how any specific individual will respond to a new event. To understand how my 
emotional responses to a tragic news item differ from someone else’s, I would want to 
refer to a variable-centered structure—such as valence and arousal dimensions. To 
understand how my emotional responses shifted after I heard a tragic news item, I would 
want to refer to a person-centered structure—which might include valence, arousal, or 
other dimensions like social and control-oriented emotions. Like personalized medicine, 
this framework has the potential to lay the groundwork for personalized predictions and 
interventions (Hamburg & Collins, 2010; Fisher, 2015). Attempts to shift someone out of 
a depression, to increase feelings of contentment and relaxation, or to anticipate how 
someone will respond to successes and failures can be based not just on comparison to 
strangers, but on that person’s own emotion structure. 
THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
I examined the underlying structure in repeated measurements of subjective 
emotional experiences. I asked participants to describe two emotional experiences from 
each day, over the course of 35 days. I examined the individualized structures of each 
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person’s emotional experience using P-technique factor analyses. I compared this to the 
emotional structures of people in general, by using an R-technique factor analysis (where 
variables are compared across people). I wanted to determine if the particular emotional 
lives of individuals differ from the emotional lives of the average or prototypical person 
at a given point in time. I predict that the structure of emotional experiences over time 
will differ across individuals, and that these differences will be more complex than those 
seen when generating a factor structure for the prototypical person at one time point. 
METHODS 
 
Participants 
A sample of 89 individuals was recruited to participate in this survey. Individuals 
were recruited via two methods: advertising via social media by the researcher, and 
offering course credit to undergraduate students in psychology courses. Only participants 
who had completed at least 30 of the 35 days requested were retained for analysis. This 
yielded 52 participants whose time series were 60 points or longer. Of these, 19 were 
undergraduate students and 33 were community members. Of these, 49 participants 
reported demographic information. This was because three community members opted 
not to complete the demographic survey sent out at the beginning of the study. The age 
range was 18 to 70, with a mean of 31.1 years old. There were 17 men and 32 women 
included in the final sample. Among these, 30 identified as white, six identified as 
Hispanic/Latino, four identified as East or Southeast Asian, two identified as South 
Asian, two identified as both Hispanic and East Asian, two identified as white and South 
Asian, one identified as Middle Eastern, one identified as white and Hispanic, and one 
identified as white and East Asian. 
  
16 
 
Measures 
Demographics and Personality. Participants reported their age, gender, and ethnicity. 
They also completed a 10-item version of the Big Five Inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, & 
Swann, 2003). This questionnaire captures information about individuals’ personality 
characteristics, based on the Five Factor Model of personality (John & Srivastava, 1999). 
Personality data are not considered here, but will be made available in the final data set 
for future research. 
 
Daily Emotions. The measure used in this study was based on prior work on emotions, 
capturing many proposed basic emotions that vary along theoretically important 
dimensions. It was also limited in size so that completing the survey would not be too 
time consuming for participants. The survey asked people: “Please remember a 
significant moment you experienced before 2:00 PM today. This should be a moment 
that you can remember clearly, including how you felt at the time.” Participants were 
asked to make a brief note about what the event was, using an open-ended text response. 
Then they rated how much they felt each of 16 emotions on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 10 
(one of the strongest times I’ve felt this emotion). Emotion terms were intended to 
capture theoretical constructs that may not have been clear to participants. Therefore, I 
included two words that helped to describe the concept. The emotion words used are 
given in Table 1. The survey then asked participants to report on a second emotional 
experience, one have occurred after 2:00 PM.  
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I referred to events as “significant” as opposed to “emotional” in order to avoid 
possible associations of the word “emotional” with negative emotional outbursts. I 
wanted to capture both positive and negative events, and a lay reading of the term 
emotional might have biased that. Further, based on informal discussions with individuals 
testing early versions of the survey, I concluded that participants might be likely to report 
that they did not have any “emotional events” in a given day—but that they would be 
likely to report that they experienced “significant events.” I was attempting to get a range 
of emotional experiences over time, including events that were not necessarily encoded 
as “emotional” but that nonetheless had some emotional content. I judged that the word 
significant would evoke these responses. I asked participants to report two such events 
from different points during the day to sample from a broader array of typical events. 
The emotion words chosen for this study were based on a review of emotion 
taxonomies developed through empirical and theoretical work. Most of the positive 
emotion constructs included in the questionnaire are part of the PANACEAS taxonomy 
developed by Shiota and colleagues (2014), and included in prior research (e.g., Campos 
et al., 2013). This research includes enthusiasm, pride, contentment, amusement, sexual 
desire, and two different forms of love. However, less empirical work has been done 
clearly differentiating these forms of love—one based in being cared for and one based 
on caring for others—and they are not clearly delineated in English (the distinction is 
seen in the Japanese term amae). Therefore a single term referring to loving/affectionate 
was included. 
Not included in this taxonomy was curiosity/interest and 
sympathetic/compassionate. However, these emotions have been studied in several other 
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lines of research. For example interest has been proposed by Izard as a basic emotion 
(Izard, 2007). Interest has also been related to persistence in work and play (Fredrickson, 
1998; Izard, 1991; Silvia, 2006). Sympathy and compassion have similarly been the 
subject of a great deal of academic research (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010; 
Eisenberg, 2000). For example, sympathy plays an important role in children’s social and 
moral development (Eisenberg, 2000; Sallquist, Eisenberg, Spinrad, Eggum, & Gaertner, 
2009); inhibits neural activity related to anger (Harmon-Jones, Vaughn-Scott, Mohr, 
Sigelman, & Harmon-Jones, 2004); and has been identified at above-chance levels in 
facial expressions (Keltner & Buswell, 1996). 
The negative emotions similarly were primarily selected to reflect existing 
theoretical taxonomies. The negative “basic emotions” proposed by Ekman were 
included: anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and contempt (Ekman, 1992). Also included was 
embarrassment, a well-studied emotion often included in newer taxonomies of basic 
emotions (Ekman, 1992; Keltner, 1995). Guilt and shame, other common self-conscious 
emotion states, have also been studied and distinguished from embarrassment (Tangney, 
Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Finally, jealousy has been considered an important 
emotion from an evolutionary perspective. Research has found that it can play an 
important role in regulating interpersonal relationships and has a distinct psychological 
profile (Hupka, 1984; Sharpsteen, 1993). 
These terms are based on a current reading of the emotion literature, with a 
premium placed on keeping participants’ response time to a minimum. The list is not 
identical to prior lists used in nomothetic research due to differences in length and 
theoretical orientation. For example, the scales used by Russell (1980), Watson and 
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Tellegen (1985), and Thayer (1986), were developed using item lists of 28, 60, and 20 
items, respectively. Short forms of these lists exist, but were developed assuming that the 
underlying two dimensional taxonomies found in larger lists are correct. These item lists 
are either too long or assume the answer to the question that I am attempting to answer by 
re-examining the structure of emotion.  
At a theoretical level, these lists are also based on a broader reading of emotion to 
include mood states and terms that current theory might not consider emotions. For 
example, Thayer’s items include wakeful, intense, and sleepy—qualities that are 
associated with subjective experience, but not necessarily emotions themselves. 
Similarly, Russell includes terms like bored, sleepy, and at ease, and Watson and 
Tellegen include terms like determined, alert, and jittery, that are feeling states but not 
necessarily emotions. These lists also miss many of the emotions that have been the 
subject of recent research. For example, none includes embarrassment, sexual desire, or 
jealousy in their lists of items. The list of emotion terms I developed here is informed by 
theoretical considerations and empirical work not available at the time when these 
previous lists were developed. 
 
Procedures. Participants who were contacted via email or social media about the study 
were directed to an introductory survey where they read a detailed description of the 
study and provided information about their demographic details and completed the 10-
item Big Five Inventory. They also provided an email address they were comfortable 
being contacted at for the duration of the study. Undergraduate participants had access to 
the introductory survey via the SONA systems psychology participation website 
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administered by Arizona State University. If they completed the introductory survey and 
provided an email at which to be contacted, then they were included in the study. 
Once the participants had consented and provided an email at which to be 
contacted, they were sent daily surveys for 35 days. In each survey, participants were 
asked to fill out the emotion questionnaire described above. The survey was administered 
via the Qualtrics survey software, and automated to send to all participants at 5:00 PM 
every day. Participants were sent a new survey link to complete every day, until they had 
completed the 35 days. A few participants volunteered to continue completing the survey 
for a few extra days, because they had missed one or more surveys earlier in the month. 
RESULTS 
 
 To understand the underlying structure of the emotion ratings, I conducted 
variable-focused factor analyses (R-technique) on the data from many participants at a 
single point in time, comparing across people. Then I conducted person-focused factor 
analyses (P-technique) on the data from each participant, comparing a single person’s 
ratings across time. The goal of factor analysis is to uncover a small number of 
underlying factors that account for a majority of the shared variation in a set of items.  
P-technique factor analysis assumes that data points are independent and 
identically distributed (Cattell, Cattell, & Rhymer, 1947; Molenaar & Nesselroade, 
2012). In the case of the data collected here, a P-technique factor analysis assumes that 
each emotional event reported on by a participant is independent of all the others, without 
any lingering effects from the previous emotional event. I tested this assumption using 
the Ljung-Box test of stationarity, which estimates whether the correlation seen between 
a measurement at one time point and the next is greater than would be expected by 
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chance. For 703 of the 819 time series analyzed, the test was non-significant, indicating 
that the assumption of stationarity was likely justified. This means that when lingering 
effects from one time point to the next were estimated, for the majority of data these 
effects were so small as to be not significantly different from zero. I chose to analyze all 
of the time series using the P-technique, even though some of the time series were non-
stationary, because recent simulation research found that the P-technique can correctly 
uncover the factor structure of a time series even if there are autocorrelations in the data 
(Molenaar & Nesselroade, 2009; Lo, Molenaar, & Rovine, 2016). 
Factor analyses were conducted using the minimum residual (OLS) factor method 
with oblimin rotation. Oblimin is an oblique rotation criterion that tries to simplify the 
structure obtained in factor analysis by minimizing the cross products of the loadings. 
This rotation is commonly applied to make factor structures more interpretable. The 
number of factors to retain in exploratory factor analysis was determined using Horn’s 
parallel test (Horn, 1965). This test creates new data sets of the same size with randomly 
generated numbers. The eigen values that would be obtained from random data are 
compared to the eigen values for the observed data. All factors with eigen values greater 
than what would be expected due to chance are retained. 
Several models had problems converging, due to the presence of a Heywood case. 
Heywood cases occur when the model estimates that a series of factors will account for 
greater than 100% of the common variation in a particular item (e.g. the two factors 
valence and arousal account for 110% of the variation in ratings of anger). This result 
does not make sense theoretically, and so researchers suggest not interpreting models 
with Heywood cases, but instead altering the model so that a Heywood case does not 
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occur. The causes of Heywood cases include not having enough data to estimate a model, 
choosing the wrong number of factors (either too many or too few), or using bad initial 
estimates of communalities. Oblique rotations also increase the likelihood of getting 
Heywood cases.  
When any of the factor analyses I performed had a Heywood case, I examined 
models with one to six different factors. I found the models that did not have Heywood 
cases associated with them, and from these chose the one with the smallest Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC) value. BIC is an index of model fit that penalizes complexity, 
so the improvement in fit from having a model with more factors is traded off against the 
fact that having more factors makes the model more complex. 
 
Results of Variable-Centered Factor Analyses 
 
 
In order to establish a comparison point for the person-centered approach, I first 
conducted factor analyses on emotional experiences at each time point. In these factor 
analyses, all the ratings made by participants on a particular day and at a particular time 
(before or after 2:00 PM) were compared. I chose to include only days when more than 
40 participants were participating, because estimating the models with fewer data points 
might lead to issues with convergence. For the same reason, I omitted variables that had 
very low variability on a particular day (SD < .20). Factor analyses for a total of 74 time 
points were retained.  
According to this criterion, 35 of 74 time points (47%) had a two-factor structure, 
26 of 74 (35%) had a three-factor structure, 12 of 74 (16%) had a four-factor structure, 
and 1 of 74 (1%) had a five-factor structure. No time points had one-factor structures or 
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more than five factors. I also examined whether there were differences according to time 
of day, morning (before 2 PM) and evening (after 2 PM). A Welch’s two sample t-test 
comparing means was non-significant (t (65.56) = 1.160, p = 0.250). The mean number 
of factors for the morning was 2.54, and for the afternoon was 2.76. Additionally, the 
number of participants responding on any given day was not significantly related to the 
number of factors (b = 0.008, t (66) = 0.833, p = .408). Using a one-factor ANOVA, I 
also found that the number of factors was also unrelated to the day of the week being 
tested (F (6, 61) = 0.515, p = 0.795). The average root mean squared error of 
approximation (RMSEA) was 0.133, and the average amount of variance accounted for 
by the factors extracted in the models was 57.5%.  
To understand the factor structures obtained in the data, I examined the pattern of 
factor loadings for each day. I labeled each factor based on the items that loaded most 
highly on that factor. On every day where two factors best fit the data, one factor 
corresponded to positive emotion and one corresponded to negative emotion. Positive 
emotions included amusement, enthusiasm, contentment, pride, curiosity, love, and 
sympathy. Negative emotions included contempt, jealousy, disgust, anxiety, 
embarrassment, anger, guilt, and sadness. An example of a model fitting this pattern is 
given in Figure 1. These models are labeled Group 1 in Table 2. 
There were a few cases where all the positive emotions and negative emotions did 
not divide perfectly. In four models, one negative emotion had a negative factor loading 
on the positivity factor. These emotions were contempt (twice), anger, and sadness. In 
these cases, ratings of the particular negative emotion were more closely related to 
feeling low positivity than to feeling high on other negative emotions. Additionally, 
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feelings of sexual desire loaded positively with positive emotions in 14 of 35 two-factor 
solutions, and positively with negative emotions in 11 of 35 two-factor solutions. In the 
other models, it did not load highly on any factor. This means that people in the sample 
were roughly evenly split in whether they experienced sexual desire with positive 
emotions, with negative emotions, or without either. 
In 18 of the 26 three factor solutions, there were factors corresponding to internal 
negative and external negative emotions. I labeled these factors internal and external 
following the developmental literature, which suggests that children tend to either focus 
negative emotionality towards themselves (internalizing) or towards others 
(externalizing; Birkley & Eckhardt, 2015; Zahn-Waxler, 2010). The internal negative 
emotion factors typically had guilt and embarrassment among their highest loading items, 
and often included anxiety and depression. In five solutions, sexual desire was also 
associated with internal negative emotions. The external negative emotion solution 
typically included feeling contempt, offended, and angry. In some cases it also included 
jealousy, and in four cases it included feeling depressed. An example of this factor 
structure is given in Figure 2. These models are labeled Group 2 in Table 2. 
 In eight of the 26 three factor solutions, there was a positivity factor, a negativity 
factor, and a factor related to romantic relationships. The positivity factors included items 
like contentment, enthusiasm, pride, amusement, and curiosity. The negativity factors 
included items like disgust, contempt, jealousy, embarrassment, anger, anxiety, and 
sadness. The romantic relationships factor included love, sympathy, and sexual desire. In 
one case, curiosity was also included with love, sympathy, and desire. In another case, 
only love and sexual desire were part of the romantic relationship factor, while sympathy 
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loaded on the positivity factor. In this model, high positivity was also associated with low 
anger. An example of this factor structure is given in Figure 3. These models are labeled 
Group 3 in Table 2. 
All of the four factor solutions had the same set of four factors: one corresponding 
to positive emotion generally, one corresponding to positive emotion surrounding a 
romantic relationship, one corresponding to internal negative emotion, and one 
corresponding to external negative emotion. These solutions split the positive and 
negative emotion factors into two separate parts. Positive emotions related to romantic 
relationships were distinguished from other positive emotions, and negative emotions 
related to blame by others were distinguished from other negative emotions. An example 
of this factor structure is given in Figure 4. These models are labeled Group 4 in Table 2. 
The factor analyses of self-reported emotion comparing many individuals at one 
time point is the typical approach to studying subjective emotional experience. Prior 
literature on emotion has suggested several different two factor solutions for emotion 
rating data. One solution consists of valence and arousal factors (Russell, 1980), another 
consists of positive and negative factors (Watson & Tellgen, 1985), and a third consists 
of tension and energy (Thayer, 1989). My analyses thus suggest that Watson and 
Tellegen’s model was most commonly seen when asking individuals about recent 
significant events. 
All of the three factor solutions retained positive versus negative distinctions, but 
31 of 74 (42%) of them also split negative emotional experiences according to those that 
were directed externally—like disgusted/offended, rejecting/contempt, jealousy, and 
anger—and those that were directed inward—like guilt, embarrassment, anxiety, and 
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depression. 21 of the 74 factor solutions (28%) included factors that were centered 
around terms related to romantic relationships, such as love, sexual desire, and sympathy. 
Prior research that found three factors in the structure of emotion labeled their structures 
valence, potency, and arousal (Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975). These labels do not clearly 
apply to the three factor solutions I identified. No potency or arousal factors were 
uncovered, and valence was split into two factors. 
 
Results of Person-Centered Factor Analyses 
 
For the P-technique factor analysis, all emotions with low variability (SD < .20) 
over the course of the 60 or more days were removed. Among the 52 time series, jealousy 
was removed 11 times, sexual desire was removed eight times, contempt was removed 
four times, and embarrassment, guilt, and disgust were each removed once. As with the 
variable-centered factor analysis, the correct number of factors was decided using Horn’s 
parallel test. In the final sample, there were 22 participants (42%) whose data was fit by a 
two factor structure; 12 (23%) whose data was fit by a three factor structure; 9 whose 
data was fit by a four factor structure (17%); seven whose data was fit by a one factor 
structure (13%); and two whose data was fit by a five factor structure (4%). 
Among males, 41% had a two factor structure, 24% had one factor, 12% had three 
factors, 12% had four factors, and 12% had five factors. Among women, 44% had a two 
factor structure, 24% had three, 20% had four, and 12% had one. There was greater 
variability among males than females in terms of factor structures, but a chi-square test 
for the difference between these groups was not significant (2 (4) = 4.97, p = .290). 
Additionally, a linear regression predicting number of factors from age was not 
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significant (F (1, 39) = 0.473, p = .496). Being from the undergraduate versus community 
sample was also not a significant predictor of number of factors (F (1, 40) = 0.548, p = 
.464). The average RMSEA for all models was 0.136, and the average amount of 
variation accounted for was 53.5%. 
In the seven cases where only one factor was found, the factor was always 
valence. Positive items would all load in one direction (e.g. contentment, enthusiasm, 
curiosity), while negative items would load in the other direction (e.g. depression, anger, 
anxiety). An example of a one factor solution is given in Figure 5. This is labeled Group 
1 in Table 3. 
Among the 22 two factor solutions, nine had one factor that corresponded to 
valence and another that corresponded to romantic relationships. Romantic relationship 
related items included love, sympathy, desire, and jealousy. Among these, two included 
positive loadings from negative emotion items: jealousy and embarrassment. For these 
two models, feeling love and sympathy was also associated with feeling jealousy or 
embarrassment. Additionally, two models had negative emotion terms with negative 
loadings. In one case, when love and sexual desire were high, contempt, disgust, and 
anger were low. In the other case, when love and sympathy were high, disgust and 
contempt were low. An example of one of these models is given in Figure 6. These 
models are labeled Group 2 in Table 3.  
Five of the 22 two factor solutions involved one valence factor and a second 
factor centered on external negative emotions. The external negative emotion factor 
typically included disgust, contempt, and anger. In two cases, it also included jealousy. In 
one case, feeling high external negative emotion was associated with feeling low 
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curiosity and amusement. An example of one of these models is given in Figure 7. These 
models are labeled Group 3 in Table 3.  
Eight of the 22 two factor solutions involved a positivity and a negativity factor. 
These corresponded to the positivity and negativity factors seen in most variable-centered 
analyses. In one case, being high on positive emotions was associated with being low on 
sadness. In another case, being high on negative emotion was associated with being low 
on amusement. Being high on negative emotion was associated with being low on pride 
in another model. In two models, being high on negative emotion was associated with 
being low on pride and contentment. An example of one of these models is given in 
Figure 8. These models are labeled Group 4 in Table 3. 
Six of the 12 three factor solutions included a positive factor, a negative factor, 
and a romantic relationship factor. These factors were comparable to similar factors seen 
in the two factor models. The core of the positivity factor was pride, contentment, 
enthusiasm, and curiosity. In one case, positivity was associated with low contempt and 
disgust. The core of the negativity factor was disgust, jealousy, guilt, fear, sadness, and 
embarrassment. In one case, negativity was associated with low contentment and pride. 
The core of the romantic relationship factor was love and sex, but amusement and 
sympathy were also in some of these factors. One relationship factor was associated with 
low anger, one with low contempt, and one with higher depression. An example of one of 
these models is given in Figure 9. These models are labeled Group 5 in Table 3. 
Six of the 12 three factor solutions included a positive factor, an internal negative 
factor, and an external negative factor. The positive factor was comparable to those 
previous described, although love was associated with it. Sex commonly shared so little 
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variance with other emotions in these models that it did not load with any factor. The 
internal negative factor reflected negative feelings turned inward, and was focused 
around guilt, embarrassment, and depression. The external negative factor reflected 
negative feelings turned outward, and was focused on contempt, disgust, and anger. An 
example of one of these models is given in Figure 10. These models are labeled Group 6 
in Table 3. 
In the most common four factor solution, there was a positive factor, an external 
negative factor, an internal negative factor, and a romantic relationship factor. This was 
seen in seven of the nine four-factor solutions. The positivity factor included items like 
amusement, pride, curiosity, enthusiasm, and contentment. The external negative factor 
included items like contempt, disgust, anger, and jealousy. The internal negative factor 
included items like embarrassment, guilt, anxiety, and depression. The romantic 
relationship factor included items like love, sex, and sympathy. An example of this factor 
structure is given in Figure 11. This structure is labeled Group 7 in Table 3. 
 Two individuals had four factor structures with two positive and two negative 
factors. These factor structures were unusual, and did not directly match each other. 
Participant 28’s two positive emotion factors included (1) pride, enthusiasm, 
contentment, and love, and (2) curiosity and amusement. Participant 18’s two positive 
emotion factors, on the other hand, included all positive emotions except sympathy, with 
sympathy loading on its own separate factor. The negative emotion factors also did not 
match each other well. Participant 28’s two negative factors included (1) sadness, guilt, 
fear, and sympathy, and (2) anger, disgust, and contempt. Participant 18’s two negative 
factors included (1) guilt and anger, and (2) fear, sadness, and disgust. These two unusual 
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four factor structures are labeled Group 8 in Table 3. The factor structure for Participant 
28 is displayed in Figure 12. 
 Two individuals had five factor solutions. These factors were positive, which 
included pride, contentment, and enthusiasm; external negative, which included anger 
and disgust; romantic relationships, which included love and sex; an internal negative 
factor with anxiety; and an internal negative factor with guilt. These two factor structures 
are labeled Group 9 in Table 3. An example of this factor structure is given in Figure 13. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The idiographic analyses yielded different emotion structures than the nomothetic 
analyses. The majority of nomothetic analyses (53%) led to a well-established two factor 
solution, with clear positivity and negativity factors. This solution was only seen in 15% 
of the idiographic factor analyses. While the nomothetic analyses included only one type 
of two factor structure, the idiographic analyses included three qualitatively different 
types of two factor solutions. The idiographic analyses also included simpler structures—
one factor solutions—than those seen in nomothetic analyses. These analyses reveal that 
the structure of emotional responding seen when comparing people to each other at one 
time point does not correspond to the structure seen when comparing one person to him 
or herself at multiple time points. There are important differences between people in what 
underlying dimensions appear to be guiding their emotional responses, and these 
individualized dimensions are more varied than those seen in nomothetic analyses. 
The content of the underlying dimensions seen in the idiographic analyses also 
differed qualitatively from those seen in the nomothetic analyses. Although only 24% of 
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the nomothetic analyses included a factor related to romantic relationships, 42% of the 
idiographic analyses included a romantic relationships factor. Having a separate 
relationship-focused factor was the most common solution for two, three, and four factor 
models. Although not all earlier attempts to uncover dimensions of emotion included 
words related to social emotions (e.g., Thayer, 1989), those that did have not uncovered 
specific factors related to close relationships (e.g. Fontaine et al., 2007; Watson & 
Tellegen, 1985). This analysis is the first I have encountered in my review of the 
literature that includes such clear evidence for a relationship factor.  
This dimension would not have emerged as an important theme had it not been 
present in so many idiographic models. Nomothetic analyses suggest that the most 
common conceptual cut to make is between positivity and negativity, but idiographic 
analyses suggest that the most common conceptual cut to make is between valence and 
relationship-focused emotions. If early emotion researchers had begun by analyzing the 
emotions of specific individuals over time, instead of analyzing “snapshots” of emotion 
in many people, then the core space in emotion theory might look quite different. Instead 
of valence versus arousal or positivity versus negativity, it would be a valence versus 
relationship space, illustrated in Figure 14. However, respecting idiographic principles, 
this distinction would be treated as common—but not universal. 
The differences between idiographic and nomothetic analyses of emotion suggest 
that emotion theory should be updated. One core theoretical question that deserves 
further investigation is what causes these idiographic differences. The answer to this 
question depends, in part, on what self-reported emotions are taken to measure. There has 
been much debate over this question in the literature, and certain theoretical perspectives 
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tend to favor different interpretations (Barrett, 2004; Frijda, 2009; Ortony, Clore, & 
Collins, 1988). Basic emotion approaches suggest that emotional subsystems exist 
independent of an individual’s ability report having them, and that differentiated self-
reports represent skill in introspection; on the other hand, cultural constructivist 
approaches suggest that emotions categories are created when an individual learns to 
associate certain states with a word, and so more or less differentiated self-reports 
represent whether individuals actually feel more or fewer emotion categories (Barrett, 
2006b). The implications of this study thus depend on other theoretical commitments. 
The cultural constructivist perspective emphasizes a “realist” approach to self-
reports, which suggests that people’s emotional experiences are how they report them—
people aren’t wrong about what they’re feeling. From this perspective, if an individual 
does not have a particular factor—for example, one individual’s analysis does not involve 
internal and external negative factors—then those underlying dimensions simply do not 
exist for that person. The differences in dimensions are the result of real differences 
between people. Constructivist researchers have suggested that all that is basic—meaning 
that which is inherited in the form of largely fixed, biologically distinct subsystems—are 
the underlying dimensions seen in emotion self-reports. However, these were based on 
nomothetic analyses. By analogy, a constructivist perspective might suggest that all that 
is biologically basic in an idiographic analysis is the specific person’s underlying 
dimensions. Some individuals might inherit only a single subsystem, which codes for 
valence, while others might inherit four subsystems, corresponding to positivity, internal 
and external negativity, and romantic relationship-focused emotions. Further 
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differences—such as residual variation in anger, disgust, and contempt not explained by 
the common external negativity factor—would be due to learned concepts. 
Another realist approach to self-reports of emotion might suggest that the 
differences in factor structures are due to constructed emotion dimensions. This approach 
would be a departure from the conceptual act model and related accounts of emotion, 
because these models have assumed that the underlying dimensions in self-reports do 
represent some basic underlying biological reality (Barrett, 2006b; Russell, 2003). If even 
the “core affect” dimensions are cultural constructions, then emotions might be 
considered cultural “all the way down.” In other words, all the significant differences 
between emotions—including distinctions between valence and arousal—are created 
through learned associations between words, situations, behaviors, and physiological 
responses. These created categories might be thought of as existing in a two-level 
hierarchy. Higher order conceptual categorizations, such as external negativity, might 
correspond to the uncovered factors, while lower order categorizations, such as love or 
desire, would correspond to the unique variation in items not accounted for by the factors. 
Similar “emotion families” have been proposed in prior emotion literature (Ekman, 1992; 
Scherer, 2009; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987). This approach would 
suggest the people develop hierarchical conceptualizations of emotion, but there is 
considerable variability in which higher order categories are learned. 
In this “pure constructivist” approach, it is possible that a single valence 
dimension is still considered basic—no models were found that did not include this 
distinction—but every distinction made beyond that would be the result of strengthening 
associations between various aspects of emotional experience. The alternate realist 
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approach that suggests deep biological differences in emotion systems, which would be a 
radical departure from much prior emotion theorizing. However, evolutionary models are 
based on competition among phenotypes within the same species (McElreath & Boyd, 
2007). If different sets of emotion subsystems have varying fitness consequences that 
depend on their environment, then people’s heterogeneity in emotion subsystems can be 
considered “adaptive bets” about which emotional distinctions will be most useful for 
navigating their environments. In either case, it is clear that constructivist perspectives on 
emotion needs some modification to account for the significant variability between 
people in emotion structures. 
Another possibility is that people’s self-reports of emotions are imperfect, not 
fully capturing what is going on within her or himself. Someone might say “I’m not 
angry,” even though that person really is angry (Frijda, 2009). Certain people may be 
better (or more honest) in reporting their emotions, and so a plausible explanation in 
differences in underlying structures are individual differences in conceptual knowledge or 
ability to attend to their own internal processes. This perspective on self-reports is 
commonly associated with basic emotion approaches, although it can be associated with 
appraisal research (Barrett, 2006; Frijda, 2009; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). Under this 
interpretation self-reports do not necessarily reflect an underlying biological or 
psychological reality. Individuals might therefore all have the same underlying emotion 
systems operating, but the difference would just be due to an individual not being able to 
clearly articulate on the self-report form how their experiences are different from each 
other. 
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A self-report “relativist” might interpret the results of this study by emphasizing 
individual differences in the ability to accurately perceive real, underlying differences 
between emotion structures. For individuals who do not have strong differentiation of 
emotions—for example, those individuals who only have a valence factor—the biological 
program corresponding to anger might still be leading to distinctive cognitive processes 
and behavioral tendencies, but they do not make as clear distinctions at a conscious, 
conceptual level (Scherer, 2009). Considering conceptual knowledge about emotions 
might therefore help to account for these differences. 
Much of the work on individual differences in the ability to report on emotion 
states has come from a cultural constructivist perspective (Barrett, 1995; 2004; Lindquist 
& Barrett, 2008). Research on emotion granularity assumes that valence and arousal are 
the core dimensions of emotional experience, so it does not test why different structures 
might arise. However, one series of studies did examine the degree to which linguistic 
differentiation in affect words—the degree to which an individual distinguishes among 
valence and arousal words, assessed by asking participants how similar the word are—
relates to self-reported emotion (Barrett, 2004). Making a greater linguistic distinction 
between arousal words was significantly related to differentiating between arousal-related 
emotion terms when reporting on emotion experiences. Results were inconsistent for 
linguistic distinctions between valence words—they were only related to self-reported 
valence experiences in one of three studies. The overall pattern, however, suggests that 
language knowledge is related to self-reports of emotion. Individuals who only have a 
valence factor in their idiographic model might therefore be experiencing a complex set 
of emotion dimensions, but not know exactly how to describe these differences using the 
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emotion words given. If these individuals were to learn about emotional differences and 
practice identifying them in their everyday experiences, then their idiographic emotion 
structure might become more complex. 
Finally, it is possible to interpret the results of this study from a situation-focused 
lens. There may be a rich array of emotion subsystems, each of which is operating 
independently, but the situations in which an individual commonly finds herself might 
cause correlations among activation of these systems. For example, if a person has a 
negative relationship with a coworker, seeing the coworker might cause contempt, 
disgust, and anger. Because this person sees their coworker every day, contempt, disgust, 
and anger are often experienced together. This would be identified as an external negative 
factor through the analysis. However, the presence of this factor would not necessarily be 
due to a common biological substrate for these emotions; each might be entirely separate 
systems. Nor would presence of this factor be due to an inability to accurately describe 
emotional experiences; each of these different emotions may be felt and reported with 
perfect accuracy. Instead, the presence of the factor would be due to the commonly 
recurring situation. This interpretation of my results therefore is compatible with a 
“realist” perspective on self-reports and a basic emotions perspective. 
This situation-driven account of idiographic structures could also be compatible 
with a constructivist account of emotion categories. Scherer (2009), in reviewing research 
on category development, suggests that emotion categories are developed by individuals 
to capture important distinctions necessary for navigating the world while at the same 
time maintaining “cognitive economy” by limiting categories to a manageable scope. 
Because this constructivist perspective emphasizes the contextually situated needs of a 
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particular person in their environment, it suggests that people living in different 
environments—for example, one in an environment with pleasant coworkers, one in an 
environment with unpleasant coworkers—might learn to make different distinctions 
among emotions. An individual with only a valence dimension might find that only a 
positive-to-negative evaluation of their daily experiences is necessary for successfully 
getting around. An individual with a valence dimension and a romantic relationship 
dimension might find that positive-to-negative and loving-to-not loving dimensions are 
necessary to make sense of their daily experiences. These two individuals have 
constructed different schemes for categorizing their emotions, based on the needs of their 
environment. The constructed schemes might be updated as each person’s life—and 
needs—change. 
Interpreting emotion structures as primarily situationally driven suggests the 
idiographic factor structures reflect the typical situations individuals find themselves in, 
as opposed to the complete set of psychological and biological responses associated with 
emotions. Idiographic emotion structures might thus be another way of developing 
taxonomies of situations, an area of recent interest in social and personality psychology 
(Rauthmann et al., 2014; Brown, Neel, & Sherman, 2015). These structures might 
represent the emotional landscape that individuals typically experience in their lives. 
Practically, this interpretation suggests that a successful intervention to change an 
individual’s emotion structure would involve changing the pattern of that person’s day-
to-day life. This follows from systems theory, which suggests that sets of variables are all 
interconnected and mutually influencing, and therefore that interventions—even those 
that influence just one element of a system—are likely to reconfigure the entire pattern of 
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the system (Fisher, 2015; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Richardson, Dale, & Marsh, 2013; 
Schmittmann et al., 2013). Repairing an unhappy relationship, therefore, might not only 
reduce certain negative emotions, but change the underlying relations among emotions so 
that a positive romantic relationships factor emerges—or a negative external factor 
disappears. 
The idiographic approach therefore also suggests new directions for basic emotion 
research. People clearly do not all report their emotions using the same set of dimensions, 
and this variability among people needs to be accounted for by basic emotion theory. One 
way to do this would be to extend important work on emotion language and 
differentiation using a different conceptual framework (Barrett, 2004; Lindquist & 
Barrett, 2008). Understanding how different people use emotion language, including how 
they have learned to share their internal experiences with others, can thus be recast. 
Differences in emotion dimensions would not suggest that concepts are being constructed 
out of otherwise unrelated components, but that the individual is developing a keener 
ability to detect real differences in her own psychology. This alternative conception of 
emotion language and concepts would be supported by finding that certain divisions are 
more likely to occur among emotions, but others are highly unlikely. This would suggest 
that those underlying emotion systems that are most similar are likely to be grouped 
together, because individuals are learning to recognize real associations between these 
systems (for a phylogenetic interpretation of these associations, see Shiota et al., in 
press). For example, love and desire are related subsystems, so individuals are likely to 
develop a romantic relationships factor. On the other hand, disgust and desire are less 
closely related subsystems, so they are less likely to load on a common factor. 
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The idiographic approach also emphasizes the interaction of person and 
environment in generating emotions. How and why individuals learn to make conceptual 
distinctions in self-reports can be considered functional questions about a person’s 
ecology (Scherer, 2009). Do people strategically fail to distinguish between internal and 
external negative emotions to avoid conflict with others? Do people who distinguish 
relationship-focused emotions from others do a better job of maintaining close 
relationships? These questions emphasize differences in the structure of the individual’s 
daily life—the common threats and opportunities that the particular person faces—when 
considering her emotional self-reports. 
The results of idiographic analyses of emotion lead to a richer emotion theory, but 
they do not necessarily obviate nomothetic analyses. Analyses should be based on the 
questions the researcher is attempting to answer, and there may be instances where 
traditional nomothetic analyses are preferred. For example, if an individual was interested 
in the average emotional response of many individuals to a particular film, Watson and 
Tellegen’s (1985) positive and negative affect factors may be appropriate. These 
dimensions might describe the types of responses many people feel while watching it. 
However, they will not describe the way that a specific individual’s emotions change 
while watching the film. 
However, it is clear that when attempting to characterize the core dimensions of 
emotional experiences, nomothetic and idiographic approaches do not yield the same 
structures. As I demonstrated empirically, only a few specific individuals match 
traditional two factor models of emotion (e.g. Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Three factor 
models of emotion, which typically include a valence, arousal, and potency/control 
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factor, also do not appear to adequately describe the person-specific models uncovered 
(Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975). The distinctions between internal and external negative 
emotions do not directly map onto either the arousal or potency/control factors, and there 
is no place for emotions specific to relationships. This social dimension is also missing 
from Fontaine and colleagues’ (2007) four factor model of valence, potency, arousal, and 
unpredictability. In fact, unpredictability was not found as a factor for any of the person-
specific or variable-specific models. None of the established nomothetic models of 
emotion correspond well to the various idiographic models found in this data. Asking 
questions based on any of the established nomothetic factor structures fails to capture the 
important distinctions in daily emotional experiences for most people. 
Finding individual differences in idiographic structures suggests many directions 
for further research. One approach has been to attempt to unify idiographic and 
nomothetic analyses. Molenaar’s research group has developed an algorithm called 
GIMME that combines idiographic and nomothetic analyses to uncover subgroups of 
individuals with different patterns of neural responses to the same stimuli (Gates & 
Molenaar, 2012; Yang, Gates, Molenaar, & Li, 2015). This approach is an extension of 
structural equation modeling, with separate structural equation models developed for all 
individuals, and then equivalence of paths in different individuals being tested. Gates and 
colleagues (2014) analyzed a sample of 80 children diagnosed with attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) using the GIMME algorithm and found five subgroups 
based on brain functioning. For example, individuals in Group A had higher than average 
connectivity from the right inferior parietal lobule to the left inferior parietal lobule. This 
connection from right to left inferior parietal lobules was below average in Group B. No 
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single pattern characterized the brain functioning of all individuals. Although there was a 
nomothetic similarity among these individuals—diagnosis with ADHD—there were also 
important idiographic differences among them based on underlying patterns of functional 
neural connectivity 
This approach suggests that emotions in the brain, like emotions in self-report, 
might have different underlying structures. For example, individuals all viewing the same 
frightening images (and all reporting similar levels of fear) might nonetheless be 
processing these emotions using a different set of underlying connections among brain 
regions. The GIMME algorithm demonstrates a statistically rigorous way of respecting 
the primacy of idiographic analysis. Individuals are compared to themselves, to uncover 
the consistent patterns in their behaviors and functioning over time. It is similarities 
among these patterns that are the basis for generalization. 
This combined idiographic and nomothetic approach has also been applied to 
daily diary measures of subjective states, and is a useful future direction for examining 
daily diaries of self-reported emotion. Beltz and colleagues (2016) analyzed 100 time 
points of daily diary data from women diagnosed with a personality disorder. They used 
four variables that had been previously established as existing at the within-subject level: 
negative affect, detachment, disinhibition, and hostility. They found that there are 
common effects for all individuals leading from negative affect to detachment and 
disinhibition to hostility. However, there are also certain relations that only occur for 
subsets of individuals. For example, in two of the four subgroups individuals had a 
lagged relation from hostility to negative affect, meaning that hostility at an earlier time 
point was associated with higher negative affect at a subsequent time point for some—but 
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not all—patients. With more data, this approach might fruitfully be applied to daily diary 
measures attempting to uncover different underlying structures of emotional responding. 
The person-centered approach also has important therapeutic applications. For 
example, Aaron Fisher (2015) describes how an idiographic approach to emotion might 
help clinicians develop personalized treatments for mood disorders. In this paper, he 
suggests that clinicians should measure the specific inputs that lead to disorders over 
time, and then subject the measurements to idiographic analyses, including P-technique 
and DFA. These analyses can help the clinician determine what inputs lead to negative 
outcomes, and thereby target treatment based on the individual client’s needs. For 
example, Fisher analyzed data from 10 different individuals diagnosed with generalized 
anxiety disorder and found that different individuals had different underlying factors, 
including worry, avoidance, procrastination, and irritability. He then examined the 
relationships between these factors over time. In one individual avoidance prospectively 
predicted worry, so that avoiding problems led to more worry in the future. In another 
participant, the relationship was reversed: worry predicted more avoidance in the future. 
Based on this knowledge, Fisher suggests different treatment strategies for these 
individuals.  
Understanding individualized structures of emotion might similarly be used to 
identify specific emotion regulation strategies tailored to the person using them. For 
example, Participant 4 in this study tended to feel low sadness and anxiety when 
experiencing high positive emotions, such as contentment, pride, enthusiasm, curiosity, 
and amusement. Distracting this person on a sad day with a funny movie or fun evening 
out might be a good regulation strategy. On the other hand, Participant 51 tended to 
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experience sadness and anxiety with feelings of guilt and embarrassment—and these 
were all independent of feeling positive emotions. To help this person deal with a sad 
day, it might be helpful to address negative feelings related to social roles. By reducing 
guilt and embarrassment, sadness would also be reduced. Idiographic analyses, like the 
kind I presented here, could be used not just to help clinical populations, but to help 
healthy individuals better understand and deal with their emotions. 
There are several limitations to this study. P-technique does not model how the 
underlying emotion factors change over time. A natural extension of this analysis is 
Dynamic Factor Analysis (DFA; Molenaar, 1985), which estimates how levels of 
constructs at one time point influence levels of constructs at the next time point. This 
would more directly assess the dynamics of emotion by identifying how shifts on one 
emotional dimension influence all the other emotion dimensions. However, researchers 
suggest that 100 time points is a rough minimum needed for good estimates of DFA 
models (Ram, Brose, & Molenaar, 2013), while P-technique factor analyses have been 
reported with as few as 50 time points (Molenaar & Nesselroade, 2009). Given the data I 
collected, with many time series being as short as 60 points, P-technique, but not DFA 
models, are feasible. However, collecting longer time series would allow for the 
estimation of more complex models and potentially yield better understanding of the 
emotional dynamics in different individuals. 
Another limitation of this study was the sample. To assess whether there are 
systemic differences in the number of emotion factors experienced by individuals based 
on specific groupings—such as age, gender, or community versus college sample—a 
between-subjects analysis must be performed. Given only 52 individuals, my power to 
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detect real differences between these groupings was low, and so the finding that there are 
no differences should be regarded as provisional until further data can be collected. 
Additionally, a more diverse sample of individuals, in terms of ethnicity, socio-economic 
status, and cultural background, would allow for the comparison of emotional 
experiences across a broader range of groups. There might be important differences in the 
underlying structures of emotional experience across different cultural groups; for 
example, East Asians subjective experiences of emotion might differ from those of 
European Americans. This presents an interesting future direction for research. 
The dominant paradigm in psychology research compares people to each other at 
one specific moment of measurement. The way these data are collected and analyzed 
relies on the assumption that all people in a population have the same underlying 
psychological structures. However, human beings constantly change. Over the course of 
thousands of moments perceiving, reacting, and thinking we slowly adapt to our 
surroundings. We are the product of the continual, repeated interplay of genes, 
environment, and culture. As such, human phenotypes may differ in deep and significant 
ways. Although past research efforts might have considered the philosophical limitations 
of assuming common psychological structures for all individuals, new developments in 
research methods can demonstrate the empirical relevance of these concerns (Molenaar & 
Campbell, 2009). By measuring the same individual repeatedly and applying person-
centered models, we can quantify the structural differences among people. Comparing 
people to themselves over time can then allow us to understand how people navigate, 
adapt, and develop in a rich, changing world. This study demonstrates how the emotional 
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lives of individuals in the world are more varied than a single snapshot of emotions can 
capture.  
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Table 1: Emotion Words in Questionnaire 
 
Enthusiastic/Excited 
Proud/Confident 
Curious/Interested 
Contented/Satisfied 
Amused/Playful 
Sympathetic/Compassionate 
Angry/Annoyed 
Jealous/Controlling 
Guilty/Ashamed 
Sad/Depressed 
Anxious/Frightened 
Embarrassed/Awkward 
Romantic/Sexual 
Loving/Affectionate 
Disgusted/Offended 
Contemptuous/Rejecting 
  
5
5
 
Table 2: Variable-Centered Analyses Organized by Group 
 
Group 1: Positivity Factor and Negativity Factor 
Day Time Factor 1 Factor 2 
15-
Mar 
Evening 
Amu/Enth/Pri/Cont/Curi/Love/Symp low 
Rej 
Depr/Guilt/Emb/Anx/Jeal/Disg/Ang 
15-
Mar 
Morning 
Enth/Pri/Amu/Curi/Cont/Symp/Love/Sex 
low Ang 
Guilt/Emb/Rej/Anx/Disg/Depr/Jeal 
16-
Mar 
Morning Enth/Curi/Amu/Pri/Cont/Sex/Symp/Love Disg/Rej/Ang/Jeal/Guilt/Depr/Emb/Anx 
17-
Mar 
Morning Pri/Curi/Cont/Enth/Amu/Symp/Love/Sex Depr/Anx/Emb/Jeal/Rej/Ang/Guilt/Disg 
18-
Mar 
Evening Enth/Pri/Amu/Cont/Symp/Love/Curi/Sex Jeal/Depr/Ang/Disg/Guilt/Emb/Rej/Anx 
18-
Mar 
Morning Pri/Enth/Cont/Amu/Curi/Symp/Love/Sex Rej/Jeal/Disg/Guilt/Emb/Depr/Ang/Anx 
19-
Mar 
Morning Enth/Amu/Cont/Curi/Pri/Love/Symp/Sex Disg/Rej/Ang/Depr/Jeal/Emb/Anx/Guilt 
20-
Mar 
Evening Enth/Cont/Pri/Amu/Curi/Symp/Love Rej/Disg/Emb/Anx/Depr/Guilt/Jeal/Sex/Ang 
21-
Mar 
Evening Enth/Amu/Cont/Pri/Curi/Love/Symp Depr/Rej/Emb/Anx/Disg/Guilt/Sex/Jeal/Ang 
21-
Mar 
Morning Pri/Cont/Curi/Amu/Enth/Symp/Love Jeal/Depr/Guilt/Emb/Rej/Ang/Disg/Anx/Sex 
23-
Mar 
Evening Cont/Enth/Amu/Pri/Curi/Symp/Love Jeal/Emb/Depr/Guilt/Ang/Anx/Disg/Rej/Sex 
  
5
6
 
23-
Mar 
Morning Enth/Cont/Pri/Amu/Curi/Symp/Love Depr/Jeal/Rej/Disg/Anx/Guilt/Emb/Ang/Sex 
25-
Mar 
Morning Enth/Pri/Cont/Amu/Curi/Love/Symp/Sex Disg/Guilt/Jeal/Emb/Depr/Ang/Rej/Anx 
27-
Mar 
Evening Enth/Pri/Cont/Amu/Curi/Sex/Love/Symp Rej/Disg/Emb/Jeal/Guilt/Ang/Anx/Depr 
27-
Mar 
Morning Enth/Curi/Cont/Amu/Pri/Love/Symp Rej/Jeal/Disg/Ang/Emb/Anx/Guilt/Depr/Sex 
29-
Mar 
Morning Amu/Curi/Enth/Cont/Pri/Symp/Love/Sex Depr/Anx/Ang/Guilt/Emb/ Disg/Rej/Jeal 
3-
Apr 
Morning Amu/Enth/Pri/Cont/Curi/Symp/Love Rej/Disg/Jeal/Depr/Anx/Guilt/Ang/Emb/Sex 
4-
Apr 
Evening Enth/Cont/Amu/Pri/Curi/Love/Symp Anx/Emb/Depr/Guilt/Jeal/Rej/Disg/Ang 
4-
Apr 
Morning Amu/Enth/Pri/Love/Cont/Symp/Curi/Sex Depr/Disg/Anx/Ang/Rej/Guilt/Emb/Jeal 
5-
Apr 
Morning Enth/Cont/Amu/Pri/Curi/Symp/Love Guilt/Disg/Anx/Jeal/Ang/Rej/Emb/Depr 
7-
Apr 
Morning Enth/Amu/Pri/Curi/Cont/Love/Symp Rej/Emb/Ang/Jeal/Guil/Disg/Depr/Anx 
8-
Apr 
Morning Amu/Curi/Pri/Enth/Cont/Love/Symp/Sex Ang/Disg/Depr/Rej/Anx/Emb/Guilt/Jeal 
9-
Apr 
Morning Amu/Enth/Pri/Curi/Cont/Love/Symp/Sex Rej/Emb/Disg/Depr/Jeal/Ang/Anx/Guilt 
11-
Apr 
Evening Amu/Enth/Pri/Cont/Curi/Symp/Love Anx/Guilt/Disg/Depr/Rej/Ang/Jeal/Emb/Sex 
  
11-
Apr 
Morning Enth/Amu/Cont/Pri/Curi/Symp/Love Guilt/Anx/Depr/Emb/Rej/Jeal/Ang/Disg 
12-
Apr 
Morning Enth/Cont/Amu/Pri/Curi/Symp Guilt/Rej/Disg/Anx/Jeal/Emb/Depr/Ang 
13-
Apr 
Morning Pri/Enth/Cont/Curi/Amu/Symp/Love Anx/Depr/Guilt/Jeal/Emb/Ang 
14-
Apr 
Evening Curi/Amu/Enth/Pri/Cont/Symp/Love Disg/Rej/Emb/Anx/Depr/Guilt/Anger/Sex 
14-
Apr 
Morning Enth/Curi/Amu/Pri/Cont/Symp/Love Jeal/Depr/Rej/Emb/Guilt/Disg/Anx/Ang 
15-
Apr 
Evening Amu/Curi/Cont/Enth/Pri/Symp/Love/Sex Disg/Rej/Anx/Depr/Guil/Jeal/Ang/Emb 
15-
Apr 
Morning Curi/Enth/Pri/Symp/Amu/Cont/Love/Jeal Disg/Rej/Anx/Guilt/Emb/Ang/Depr 
16-
Apr 
Evening 
Enth/Amu/Cont/Pri/Curi/Love/Symp low 
Rej 
Depr/Jeal/Guilt/Disg/Anx/Ang/Emb 
16-
Apr 
Morning Enth/Amu/Curi/Cont/Pri/Love/Symp/Sex Jeal/Guilt/Ang/Depr/Rej/Anx/Disg/Emb 
19-
Apr 
Evening 
Enth/Amu/Cont/Pri/Curi/Love/Symp low 
Depr 
Jeal/Emb/Rej/Anx/Guilt/Ang/Disg/Sex 
19-
Apr 
Morning Amu/Cont/Pri/Curi/Symp/Enth/Love 
Rej/Emb/Disg/Anx/Jeal/Sex/ 
Depr/Guilt/Ang 
 
 
 
 
5
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Group 2: Positivity Factor, Internal Negativity, External Negativity 
Day Time Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
16-
Mar 
Evening Amu/Cont/Enth/Pri/Love/Sex/Curi Depr/Guilt/Anx/Jeal/Emb Rej/Disg/Ang 
17-
Mar 
Evening Amu/Pri/Enth/Cont/Love/Curi/Symp/Sex Guilt/Emb/Depr/Jeal/Anx/Ang Disg/Rej 
19-
Mar 
Evening Curi/Amu/Pri/Symp/Love/ 
Enth/Cont/Sex 
Emb/Guilt/Anx/Jeal Disg/Ang/ Depr/Rej 
20-
Mar 
Morning Amu/Enth/Pri/Curi/Cont/ Symp/Love 
low Ang 
Anx/Guilt/Emb/Depr Jeal/Rej/Sex/ Disg 
26-
Mar 
Morning Pri/Enth/Amu/Cont/Curi/ 
Symp/Sex/Love 
Guilt/Jeal/Emb/Depr/Anx Disg/Rej/Ang 
28-
Mar 
Morning Enth/Pri/Cont/Amu/Curi/ Symp/Love Depr/Guilt/Anx/Jeal/Ang/Sex Disg/Rej/Emb 
31-
Mar 
Evening Amu/Enth/Pri/Cont/Curi/Love/Symp Depr/Guilt/Jeal/Emb Disg/Rej/Anx/Ang 
1-
Apr 
Evening Cont/Pri/Amu/Enth/Curi/ Symp/Love Guilt/Anx/Jeal/Depr/Ang/Emb Rej/Disg 
2-
Apr 
Evening Curi/Enth/Amu/Cont/Pri/ Symp/Love 
low Ang 
Emb/Guilt/Anx/Rej Disg/Jeal/Depr 
2-
Apr 
Morning Curi/Enth/Pri/Amu/Cont/ 
Symp/Love/Sex 
Guilt/Depr/Emb/Anx/Jeal Disg/Rej/Ang 
5-
Apr 
Evening Pri/Enth/Cont/Amu/Curi/Love Symp/Depr/Emb/Anx/Sex Rej/Disg/Ang/Jeal 
5
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6-
Apr 
Evening Amu/Pri/Enth/Curi/Cont/Love/Sex/Symp Guilt/Depr/Anxi/Depr Rej/Jeal/Disg/Ang 
6-
Apr 
Morning Amu/Enth/Cont/Curi/Pri/Love/Symp/Sex Emb/Anx/Guil Disg/Depr/ 
Ang/Jeal/Rej 
7-
Apr 
Evening Curi/Pri/Amu/Enth/Cont/ Symp Guilt/Jeal/Emb/Depr/Love/Sex/Anx Disg/Rej/Ang 
9-
Apr 
Evening Enth/Cont/Curi/Pri/Amu Anx/Love/Symp/Depr/Emb/ 
Guilt/Sex/Jeal 
Rej/Disg/Ang 
10-
Apr 
Morning Curi/Pri/Amu/Cont/Enth/ Symp/Love Guilt/Emb/Anx/Depr/Sex Rej/Disg/Jeal/Ang 
20-
Apr 
Evening Cont/Pri/Curi/Amu/Enth/ Symp/Love Guil/Depr/Emb Jeal/Disg/Ang/Rej/Anx 
20-
Apr 
Morning Amu/Cont/Symp/Enth/Pri/ Curi/Love Guilt/Emb/Jeal Rej/Disg/Anx/Depr/Ang 
 
Group 3: Positivity Factor, Negativity Factor, Romance Factor 
Day Time Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
25-
Mar 
Evening 
Enth/Cont/Pri/Amu/Curi/ 
Symp low Ang 
Guilt/Emb/Rej/Jeal/Disg/Anx/Depr Sex/Love 
28-
Mar 
Evening Cont/Enth/Pri/Amu/Curi Guilt/Rej/Emb/Depr/Disg/Anx/Jeal/Ang Symp/Love/ Sex 
29-
Mar 
Evening Cont/Pri/Enth/Amu/Curi Ang/Anx/Depr/Disg/Emb/Rej/Guilt/Jeal Love/Symp/ Sex 
3-Apr Evening Enth/Pri/Cont/Amu/Curi Rej/Emb/Guilt/Anx/Depr/Disg/Ang/Jeal Love/Sex/ Symp 
5
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8-Apr Evening Cont/Enth/Pri/Curi/Amu Disg/Rej/Jeal/Emb/Guilt/Anx/Ang Love/Symp/ Sex 
10-
Apr 
Evening Cont/Enth/Pri/Amu Emb/Jeal/Guilt/Anx/Disg/Rej/Ang/Depr 
Love/Symp/ 
Sex/Curi 
17-
Apr 
Evening 
Amu/Cont/Pri/Enth/Curi/ 
Symp/Love/Sex 
Guilt/Emb/Depr/Anx Rej/Disg/Ang/Jeal 
17-
Apr 
Morning Pri/Enth/Amu/Cont/Curi Disg/Rej/Jeal/Emb/Anx/Ang/Depr/Guilt Love/Sex/ Symp 
 
 
Group 4: Positivity Factor, Internal Negativity, External Negativity, Romance Factor 
Day Time Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor3 Factor 4 
22-
Mar 
Morning Cont/Enth/Pri/Amu low 
Guilt 
Anx/Depr/Jeal/Emb Rej/Disg/Ang Symp/Love/ 
Curi/Sex 
24-
Mar 
Evening Enth/Curi/Pri/Amu/Cont/ 
Symp 
Emb/Guilt/ Anx/Depr Rej/Disg/Ang/Jeal Love/Sex 
24-
Mar 
Morning Enth/Curi/Pri/Cont/Amu/ 
Symp 
Guilt/Emb/ Anx/Depr Disg/Rej/Ang Love/Sex/Jeal 
26-
Mar 
Evening Enth/Pri/Cont/Amu/Curi Emb/Guilt/ Anx/Depr Rej/Ang/Disg/Jeal Love/Sex/ 
Symp 
30-
Mar 
Evening Enth/Pri/Cont/Amu/Curi Guilt/Depr/ 
Anx/Emb/Ang/Jeal 
Disg/Rej Love/Symp/ 
Sex 
30-
Mar 
Morning Pri/Enth/Amu/Cont/Curi Guilt/Anx/ Depr/Jeal/Emb Rej/Disg/Ang Love/Sex/ 
Symp 
31-
Mar 
Morning Enth/Cont/Amu/Curi/Pri Guilt/Emb/ Anx/Depr Disg/Rej/Ang/Jeal Symp/Love/ 
Sex 
6
0
 
  
1-
Apr 
Morning Pri/Cont/Enth/Amu/Curi/ 
Symp 
Emb/Depr/ Anx/Ang/Guilt Disg/Rej/Jeal Love/Sex 
12-
Apr 
Evening Enth/Pri/Amu/Curi/Cont 
low Depr 
Jeal/Anx/Guilt/Emb/Ang Disg/Rej Love/Symp/ 
Sex 
13-
Apr 
Evening Enth/Cont/Pri/Cont/Amu 
low Depr 
Anx/Emb/ Guilt Disg/Rej/Jeal/Ang Love/Symp/ 
Sex 
18-
Apr 
Evening Enth/Cont/Pri/Amu/Curi Depr/Guilt/ Emb/Anx/Jeal Disg/Rej/Ang Love/Sex/ 
Symp 
18-
Apr 
Morning Enth/Cont/Curi/Pri/Amu Anx/Depr/ Guilt/Emb Rej/Disgust/ Jeal Symp/Love low 
Ang 
 
Group 5: Positivity Factor, External Negativity, Romance, Two Internal Negativity Factors 
Day Time Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
22-
Mar 
Evening Enth/Pri/Cont/Curi/Amu Rej/Disg/Ang/Jeal Symp/Love/ 
Sex 
Anx/Depr Guilt/Emb 
  
6
1
 
  
Table 3: Person-Centered Analyses Organized by Group 
 
Group 1: One Valence Factor 
Part 
N 
Factor 1 
12 Depr/Rej/Ang/Disg/Anx/Guilt/Jeal/Emb low Cont/Enth/Amu/Pri/Symp/Curi/Sex 
46 Enth/Curi/Amu/Pri/Love/Sex/Symp low Ang/Disg/Rej/Guilt/Depr 
13 Disg/Rej/Jeal/Ang/Guil/Depr/Emb/Anx low Cont/Curi/Pri/Amu/Enth/Love/Symp 
20 Pri/Enth/Amu/Cont/Love/Curi low Ang/Depr/Anx/Rej/Disg 
49 Enth/Pri/Cont/Amu/Curi/Symp/Love low Depr/Guilt/Ang/Disg/Rej/Jeal/Anx/Emb 
52 Cont/Pri/Enth/Amu/Symp/Curi/Love low Ang/Guilt/Emb/Depr/Anx 
22 Disg/Rej/Ang/Emb/Depr/Guil low Cont/Enth/Pri 
 
Group 2: Valence Factor and Romantic Relationship Factor 
Part 
N 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
29 
Anx/Depr/Emb/Guilt/Ang/Rej/Disg/Jeal low 
Cont/Enth/Pri/Amu/Curi 
Love/Sex/Symp 
34 Depr/Ang/Guilt/Jeal/Anx/Disg/Rej/Emb low Cont/Enth/Pri/Curi Love/Symp/Sex/Amu 
44 Depr/Rej/Guilt/Anx/Emb/Ang/Disg low Enth/Pri/Cont/Curi/Amu Love/Sex/Symp 
41 Ang/Depr/Rej/Disg/Jeal/Anx/Emb/Guilt low Cont/Enth/Pri/Amu Love/Sex 
43 Depr/Guilt/Anx/Ang/Curi low Cont/Pri/Enth Love/Symp/Amu/Jeal 
50 Enth/Cont/Amu/Pri/Curi low Depr/Ang/Rej/Anx Love/Symp/Sex/Emb 
23 
Ang/Depr/Rej/Emb/Disg/Guilt/Anx low 
Enth/Pri/Cont/Amu/Love 
Jeal/Curi/Symp/Sex 
6
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8 Cont/Pri/Enth/Amu/Curi low Depr/Guilt/Anx/Symp Love/Sex low Rej/Disg/Ang 
17 Guilt/Anx/Depr/Emb/Jeal/Ang low Cont/Enth/Amu/Curi Disg/Rej low Love/Symp 
 
Group 3: Valence and External Negative Factor 
Part 
N 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
47 
Enth/Amu/Cont/Symp/Curi/Pri/Love/Sex low 
Depr/Guilt/Emb/Anx 
Rej/Disg/Ang/Jeal 
48 Pri/Enth/Cont/Amu/Curi/Symp/Love low Depr Disg/Rej/Ang/Anx/Emb 
32 Enth/Cont/Curi low Depr/Symp Emb/Disg/Anger 
1 Guilt/Emb/Depr/Ang/Disg/Anx low Enth/Pri/Cont/Amu/Curi Rej 
39 Cont/Love/Pri/Enth low Anx/Guilt/Emb/Depr Ang/Disg/Rej/Jeal low Curi/Amu/Symp 
 
Group 4: Positivity Factor and Negativity Factor 
Part 
N 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
10 Enth/Cont/Amu/Curi/Pri/Love Disg/Rej/Ang/Depr/Anx 
19 Amu/Enth/Curi/Pri/Cont/Love/Symp/Sex Guilt/Emb/Rej/Depr/Jeal/Anx/Disg/Ang 
27 Amu/Enth/Love/Curi/Symp 
Disg/Rej/Depr/Ang/Emb/Guilt/Anx low 
Cont/Pri 
31 Symp/Amu/Curi/Love/Pri/Enth/Sex 
Ang/Emb/Guilt/Anx/Depr/Jeal/Rej/Disg 
low Cont 
21 Enth/Pri/Curi/Amu/Cont/Love Ang/Depr/Disg/Jeal/Anx/Rej/Guilt/Symp 
33 Enth/Cont/Pri/Love/Symp/Curi 
Depr/Anx/Rej/Disg/Emb/Jeal/Guilt low 
Amu 
6
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40 Symp/Amu/Love/Sex/Jeal/Curi/Enth/Cont Depr/Anx/Ang/Rej/Guilt/Emb low Pri 
36 Amu/Sex/Enth/Curi/Symp/Love low Depr 
Rej/Disg/Ang/Jeal/Emb/Anx/Guilt low 
Pri/Cont 
 
Group 5: Positive Factor, Negative Factor, and Romantic Relationship Factor 
Part 
N 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
45 Enth/Curi/Amu/Pri/Cont/Symp Disg/Jeal/Rej/Ang/Guilt/Anx/Emb Love/Sex/Depr 
42 Curi/Cont/Enth/Pri/Amu/Symp Emb/Anx/Disg/Ang/Depr/Jeal/Rej Love/Sex 
6 Enth/Cont/Amu/Curi/Pri low Depr Disg/Ang/Anx/Emb/Guilt/Rej/Jeal Love/Symp/Sex 
11 Cont/Pri/Enth/Curi Anx/Depr/Guilt/Emb/Jeal/Symp/Ang 
Love/Sex/Amu low 
Rej 
26 Cont/Enth/Pri/Curi/Amu low Rej/Disg Jeal/Guilt/Anx/Depr/Emb 
Love/Symp/Sex low 
Ang 
24 Curi/Enth 
Disg/Guilt/Ang/Emb/Rej/Depr/Anx/Jeal 
low Cont/Pri 
Love/Sex/Amu/Symp 
 
Group 6: Positive Factor, Internal Negative Factor, and External Negative Factor 
Part 
N 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
3 
Cont/Enth/Amu/Love/Curi/Symp/Pri/Sex 
low Anx/Depr 
Rej/Disg/Ang Guilt/Emb 
25 Enth/Amu/Pri/Curi/Symp/Love low Ang Rej/Disg 
Guilt/Anx/Emb/Depr/Jeal 
low Cont 
30 
Symp/Sex/Pri/Love/Amu/Enth/Cont low 
Anx 
Disg/Ang/Rej Guilt/Depr/Emb/Jeal 
6
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38 Enth/Cont/Pri/Curi/Amu low Ang/Depr Anx/Rej/Emb Guilt/Disg 
15 Love/Enth/Amu/Curi/Sex/Pri/Cont/Symp Rej/Disg/Jeal Guilt/Emb/Depr/Ang 
35 Amu/Cont/Enth/Love/Symp Rej/Disg/Ang/Depr/Guilt/Emb Pride/Curi/Anx 
 
Group 7: Positive Factor, External Negative Factor, Internal Negative Factor, Romantic Relationship Factor 
Part 
N 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
51 Amu/Curi/Pri/Enth/Cont Rej/Ang/Disg/Jeal 
Guilt/Emb/Anx/Dep
r 
Sex/Love/Symp 
5 Pri/Enth/Amu/Cont/Curi Disg/Rej/Ang/Jeal Emb/Guilt/Anx 
Love/Symp/Depr/Se
x 
37 Cont/Enth/Amu/Curi/Pri Ang/Depr/Disg Guilt/Emb/Anx Sex/Love/Symp 
4 
Pri/Cont/Enth/Curi/Amu/Symp low 
Depr/Anx 
Disg/Rej/Ang Emb/Guilt Love/Sex 
9 Enth/Cont/Pri/Amu low Ang 
Disg/Reject/Depr/An
x 
Guilt/Emb Symp/Curi/Love 
7 Pri/Amu/Enth/Cont/Curi Disg/Rej/Ang Depr Love/Symp/Anx 
14 Pri/Cont low Emb/Guil/Anx Ang/Rej/Disg low Symp/Depr Love/Sex/Amu 
 
Group 8: Two Positive, Two Negative Factors 
Part 
N 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
28 Pri/Enth/Cont/Love Curi/Amu Depr/Guilt/Anx/Symp Ang/Disg/Rej 
6
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18 Enth/Curi/Cont/Pri/Amu low Emb Symp Guilt/Anger Anx/Depr/Disgust 
 
Group 9: Positive Factor, External Negative Factor, Romantic Relationship Factor, Two Internal Negative 
Factors 
Part 
N 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
2 
Cont/Pri/Enth low 
Symp 
Ang/Disg Sex/Amu/Love/Curi Emb/Anx Depr/Guilt 
16 Pri/Curi/Enth/Cont Disg/Rej/Ang Love/Sex Anx/Depr/Symp Emb/Guilt/Amu 
 
6
6
 
  67 
Figure 1: Nomothetic Model with A Positivity and Negativity Factor 
 
 
Note: Black lines indicate positive loadings. Red lines indicate negative loadings. The 
strength of the loading of the particular item on the factor is written on top of the line. 
Only loadings over 0.3 are depicted. Variable abbreviations that do not have a line 
connecting them to a factor do not load highly on any factor. Graphics are generated 
through the “psych” package in R (Revelle, 2017). 
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Figure 2: Nomothetic Model with Positivity, Internal Negativity, and External Negativity 
Factors 
 
 
Note: Black lines indicate positive loadings. Red lines indicate negative loadings. The 
strength of the loading of the particular item on the factor is written on top of the line. 
Only loadings over 0.3 are depicted. Variable abbreviations that do not have a line 
connecting them to a factor do not load highly on any factor. Graphics are generated 
through the “psych” package in R (Revelle, 2017). 
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Figure 3: Nomothetic Model with Positivity, Negativity, and Romantic Relationship 
Factors 
 
 
Note: Black lines indicate positive loadings. Red lines indicate negative loadings. The 
strength of the loading of the particular item on the factor is written on top of the line. 
Only loadings over 0.3 are depicted. Variable abbreviations that do not have a line 
connecting them to a factor do not load highly on any factor. Graphics are generated 
through the “psych” package in R (Revelle, 2017). 
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Figure 4: Nomothetic Model with Positivity, Internal Negative, External Negative, and 
Romantic Relationship Factors 
 
 
Note: Black lines indicate positive loadings. Red lines indicate negative loadings. The 
strength of the loading of the particular item on the factor is written on top of the line. 
Only loadings over 0.3 are depicted. Variable abbreviations that do not have a line 
connecting them to a factor do not load highly on any factor. Graphics are generated 
through the “psych” package in R (Revelle, 2017). 
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Figure 5: Idiographic Model with a One-Factor Structure 
 
 
Note: Black lines indicate positive loadings. Red lines indicate negative loadings. The 
strength of the loading of the particular item on the factor is written on top of the line. 
Only loadings over 0.3 are depicted. Variable abbreviations that do not have a line 
connecting them to a factor do not load highly on any factor. Graphics are generated 
through the “psych” package in R (Revelle, 2017). 
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Figure 6: Idiographic Model with Valence and Relationship Factors 
 
 
Note: Black lines indicate positive loadings. Red lines indicate negative loadings. The 
strength of the loading of the particular item on the factor is written on top of the line. 
Only loadings over 0.3 are depicted. Variable abbreviations that do not have a line 
connecting them to a factor do not load highly on any factor. Graphics are generated 
through the psych package in R (Revelle, 2017). 
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Figure 7: Idiographic Model with Valence and External Negative Factors 
 
 
Note: Black lines indicate positive loadings. Red lines indicate negative loadings. The 
strength of the loading of the particular item on the factor is written on top of the line. 
Only loadings over 0.3 are depicted. Variable abbreviations that do not have a line 
connecting them to a factor do not load highly on any factor. Graphics are generated 
through the psych package in R (Revelle, 2017). 
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Figure 8: Idiographic Model with Positivity and Negativity Factors 
 
 
Note: Black lines indicate positive loadings. Red lines indicate negative loadings. The 
strength of the loading of the particular item on the factor is written on top of the line. 
Only loadings over 0.3 are depicted. Variable abbreviations that do not have a line 
connecting them to a factor do not load highly on any factor. Graphics are generated 
through the psych package in R (Revelle, 2017). 
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Figure 9: Idiographic Model with Positive, Negative, and Romantic Relationship Factors 
 
Note: Black lines indicate positive loadings. Red lines indicate negative loadings. The 
strength of the loading of the particular item on the factor is written on top of the line. 
Only loadings over 0.3 are depicted. Variable abbreviations that do not have a line 
connecting them to a factor do not load highly on any factor. Graphics are generated 
through the psych package in R (Revelle, 2017). 
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Figure 10: Idiographic Model with Positive, Internal Negative, and External Negative 
Factors 
 
 
Note: Black lines indicate positive loadings. Red lines indicate negative loadings. The 
strength of the loading of the particular item on the factor is written on top of the line. 
Only loadings over 0.3 are depicted. Variable abbreviations that do not have a line 
connecting them to a factor do not load highly on any factor. Graphics are generated 
through the psych package in R (Revelle, 2017). 
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Figure 11: Idiographic Model with Positive, External Negative, Internal Negative, and 
Romantic Relationship Factors 
 
Note: Black lines indicate positive loadings. Red lines indicate negative loadings. The 
strength of the loading of the particular item on the factor is written on top of the line. 
Only loadings over 0.3 are depicted. Variable abbreviations that do not have a line 
connecting them to a factor do not load highly on any factor. Graphics are generated 
through the psych package in R (Revelle, 2017). 
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Figure 12: Idiographic Model with Two Positive and Two Negative Factors 
 
 
Note: Black lines indicate positive loadings. Red lines indicate negative loadings. The 
strength of the loading of the particular item on the factor is written on top of the line. 
Only loadings over 0.3 are depicted. Variable abbreviations that do not have a line 
connecting them to a factor do not load highly on any factor. Graphics are generated 
through the psych package in R (Revelle, 2017). 
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Figure 13: Idiographic Model with Positive, External Negative, Romantic Relationship, 
and Two Internal Negative Factors 
 
 
Note: Black lines indicate positive loadings. Red lines indicate negative loadings. The 
strength of the loading of the particular item on the factor is written on top of the line. 
Only loadings over 0.3 are depicted. Variable abbreviations that do not have a line 
connecting them to a factor do not load highly on any factor. Graphics are generated 
through the psych package in R (Revelle, 2017). 
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Figure 14: The Most Common Two-Dimensional Structure of Affect in a Person-
Centered Analysis 
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